Abstract-A new scheme in probabilistic packet marking (PPM) for IP traceback against denial-of-service attack is presented. Non-preemptive PPM is performed while a marked packet is coming, but compensates the reduction of marking probability in marked-free packets. The nonpreemptive compensation makes the probability of each marked packet arrived at the victim is equal to its original marking probability. This scheme efficiently improves the convergent amount of marked packets required for reconstructing the complete attack path.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
P TRACEBACK is a technique for identifying the source of the anonymous flood-type denial-of-service (DoS) attack, which consumes the resource of the victim with hundreds of thousands of spoofed packets to obstruct services to legal users, to make the attacker accountable. Numerous approaches have been proposed, such as ingress filtering, packets logging, link testing, and additional Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) messages, etc., [1] . Generally, probabilitic packet marking (PPM) [1] - [3] is still better than others, because it is simple to incrementally implement, does not need any additional bandwidth or storage, and can be performed "post mortem." In this letter, we first review S. Savage's PPM [1] , and then introduce and analyze our scheme on improving the PPM's convergence.
II. PROBABILISTIC PACKET MARKING (PPM)
Each router with PPM marks packets probabilistically, and the victim reconstructs the attack path by collecting enough marked packets after a DoS attack is detected. Because 50% of DoS attacks have at least 1000 packets per second, and most attacks last at least 10 min [4] , then the victim may obtain enough marked packets. The algorithm is shown as Fig. 1 [1] .
In PPM, there are four important criteria: 1) the convergent amount of marked attack packets; 2) the computing overhead for reconstructing the attack path; 3) the robust against the false positive/negative,; and 4) the deployment cost. In this letter, our main objective is to improve the convergent amount. If each router has a disjoint equal marking probability , the probability of receiving a marked packet from a router, hops away from the victim, will be reduced to . PPM conservatively assumes that marked packets from all of routers have the same likelihood as the furthest router, and the number of packets required for reconstructing a path of routers has the following bounded expectation [1] : (1) where is the expected trial number of obtaining at least each kind of equiprobable marked packets from routers respectively according to the coupon collector problem [5] , and . By differentiating (1), the optimal is .
III. PPM WITH NON-PREEMPTIVE COMPENSATION (PPM-NPC)
We propose a simple and efficient improvement in PPM, trying to make each router along the attack path can fully nonpreemptively compensate the reduced marking probability by utilizing lots of marked-free packets, so that the probability that a marked packet is received by the victim is equal to its marking probability . The PPM-NPC marking procedure is shown as Fig. 2 .
PPM-NPC is similar with PPM, but when a router receives a marked packet and , it will increase its compensation counter instead of re-marking this packet. While , the reduced probability of nonpreemptive marking will be compensated by marking a marked-free packet, and the compensation counter will be decreased.
IV. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of PPM-NPC from two important properties and the compensation counter's efficiency. Fig. 3 is the decision tree in , , and . A router labeled as indicates that the distance between the attack source and this router is hops, and is the attached router of the victim. We define two parameters: (i) is the probability that a packet is marked by , and this marked packet will arrive at the successive router , where .
A. Properties of PPM-NPC
(ii) is the probability that outgoing packets from are marked-free.There are two properties as follows: 1) . As the nonpreemptive nature of PPM-NPC, every packet marked by will arrive at the successive routers without being altered, so that while . The reduction of marking probability caused by the nonpreemptive scheme may be compensated in lots of marked-free packets. If the volume of marked-free packets is greater than the reduction, may be equal to , which is the marking probability in any router. 2) , for all . Proof: The general form of is as follows:
(2) Fig. 3 . PPM-NPC decision tree from router R to router R (x; x)-marked-free situation 3-nonpreemptive situation -compensated situation.
The first term in (2) is the probability of marked-free packets, and the second term is the reduction of marking probability in . We know that , so that
Now, we prove . When , . When , . Assume that is true while (4) so that is true for all Property 2 shows that is a monotonously decreasing series, and while . If the distance from the attacker to the victim is hops, and we set as , then we can get for all . This result shows that the volume of marked-free packets is always equal to or greater than the reduction of marking probability, so that we can get in all and . In PPM, the field of distance is 5 bits, this means that the longest path from the attacker to the victim is 31 hops, the value is reasonable for a practical network [1] . Therefore, if we set as 1/31, then , and is true for all and .
implies the marked packets marked by any router will arrive at the victim without being altered.
B. The Consideration of Compensation Counter
In programming language C, the size of normal integer variable is 2 bytes. For a 2-byte unsigned integer variable, the counter could have 655 356 unsigned integers. Furthermore, the probability required for being compensated in is
As the discussion in PPM-NPC properties, we will set as . We can conservatively assume that the probability required for being compensated, in worst case, is for each router. If the total number of packets is , each router's counter must handle at most. While the number of packets required for convergence in PPM-NPC is , the necessary counter size of a linear topology is: (6) While is 10 and is 1/25 as in [4] , the average counter size of each router is approximately 4. Therefore, for a 2-byte integer variable, we can cope with (65536/4) different attack paths, especially in the distributed DoS.
V. SIMULATION RESULT
We use the real-time NS-2 simulator [6] to verify our scheme. The experimental linear topology consists of 1 attacker, 1 victim, and 10 intermediate routers. The attack traffic rate is 200 User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets per second. The marking probability is 0.1. After 15 simulation runs, the mean value is roughly 30, and the standard deviation is 7.8. Because the idea result is , our simulation result also proves our PPM-NPC scheme can approach the optimal situation.
VI. CONCLUSION
With nonpreemptively compensation, the probability of each marked packet arrived at the victim is equal to its original marking probability. Therefore, the PPM-NPC will efficiently achieve the optimal convergent situation by simply utilizing a 2-byte integer counter.
